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Security in sensor networks is an active but wide-open research field. Past 
experiences with other wireless technologies have shown that security will be an 
important factor in deciding the viability of sensor networks. But sensor networks have 
entirely different physical and network characteristics from conventional wireless 
networks, so they pose unique security challenges where traditional security techniques 
cannot be applied directly. 
There are two dominant sensor network implementations in the market today, 
namely TinyOS and IEEE 802.15.4. TinyOS targets devices where energy and 
computation power are significant resource constraints. IEEE 802.15.4 takes a more 
modular approach to its design, and is suited for a variety of devices and applications. 
Currently TinyOS is more popular. But the formal adoption of the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard should accelerate its acceptance in the sensor network community. 
In this thesis, the security architectures of TinyOS and IEEE 802.15.4 are 
examined. The focus is on link layer security because, like other wireless networking 
technologies, the threat of interception by an adversary is always present. The security 
services they provide are described in terms of access control, message confidentiality, 
message integrity, and replay protection.  
It is pointed out that in general, IEEE 802.15.4 offers higher assurance in terms of 
cryptographic strength, message integrity, and information leakage from IV reuse. 
TinyOS applications will need robust re-keying support and countermeasures against 
forgery attempts to make up the difference.  But they both lack effective peer-level access 
control and replay protection – both important aspects of sensor network security. 
For resource-limited sensor networks, TinyOS is still the better choice. For 
military applications where security and performance needs dominate, a hybrid 
TinyOS/IEEE 802.15.4 system would be ideal. Given the open source nature of the 
TinyOS project, it is conceivable that TinyOS can be adapted to leverage on IEEE 
802.15.4-compliant hardware for its link layer security, instead of relying on TinySec – 
 xiv 
TinyOS’s own link layer security implementation. TinyOS packets can be encapsulated 
inside IEEE 802.15.4 frames, just like TCP/IP packets are encapsulated inside IEEE 
802.11 frames. In this way, sensor network applications can be built that enjoy the best of 
both worlds – the mature and optimized environment of TinyOS, and the superior link 
layer security offered by IEEE 802.15.4. 
The design and implementation of a TinyOS Sniffer tool is presented. A sniffer is 
the quintessential tool for modern day network and security analysis. But such a tool is 
presently lacking in today’s sensor network development kits. The current design is based 
on existing sensor network hardware and software components to enable a low-cost 
sniffer implementation. The sniffer has also been designed to be easily extensible in 
terms of functionalities. Captured frames for a simple sensor network application are 
analyzed for the purpose of validation. 
The following are recommended areas for further research: 
• Improve the functionality of the TinyOS sniffer. Areas of improvement 
include tighter integration of the Sniffer with the mote hardware, and 
additional output modes for packet data such as the XML format. 
• Integrating TinyOS with 802.15.4-compliant hardware, with support for peer-
level access control and replay protection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Security in sensor networks is an active but wide-open research field. Initial 
research efforts in sensor networks have understandably been focused on functionality, 
stability, and cost effectiveness. But past experiences with other wireless technologies 
have shown that security will be an equally important factor in deciding the viability of 
sensor networks. In order for a sensor network to be resilient to the myriad of network 
attacks that it will inevitably face, security must pervade its entire system design. The 
good news is that the sensor network is still very much in its infancy, so there are ample 
opportunities for researchers to ensure that security is designed into sensor networks, and 
that it is done right. The bad news, however, is that since sensor networks have entirely 
different physical and network characteristics from conventional wireless networks, they 
pose unique security challenges where traditional security techniques cannot be applied 
directly. New and innovative approaches must be sought. 
 
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis examines the current state of sensor network security, assesses its 
adequacy, and identifies potential areas of research. The main objective is to understand 
the design and implementation issues in realizing a secure deployable sensor network. A 
secondary objective is the design and development of a sensor network packet sniffer. A 
sensor network packet sniffer will assist in further analyzing and validating some of the 
issues identified in this thesis. 
 
C. RELATED WORK 
Researchers have known about the challenges facing sensor network security 
[1,2,3]. These include key establishment and trust setup, secrecy and authentication, 
privacy of sensed data, denial-of-service, secure routing, node capture, eavesdropping, 
and malicious use of the technology. For denial of service, researchers have found that a 
variety of attacks can be mounted at the physical, link, network and transport layers [4]. 
2 
New classes of routing attacks, called sinkhole and HELLO floods, have been devised 
[5]. In addition, a variety of ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networking attacks, like the Sybil 
attack [6], can be adapted into powerful attacks against sensor networks [7]. Commercial 
tools are available for packet sniffing of a IEEE 802.15.4 network [8]. 
Researchers have studied the security of IEEE 802.15.4, and a few problems have 
been found [9]. These include lack of integrity protection for acknowledgement packets, 
key management issues, and lack of support for group keying models. Nonetheless, they 
conceded that the 802.15.4 security is fundamentally sound, and that proper use of the 
security API can lead to secure applications. SNEP (Secure Network Encryption 
Protocol), part of the SPINS [10] (Secure Protocols for Sensor Networks) framework, 
appears to be an alternative security architecture specifically targeted at sensor networks. 
But SNEP was unfortunately not fully specified nor fully implemented. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The first step to a secure deployable sensor network is to understand the security 
from the ground up. Chapters II and III of the thesis examine the link layer security 
offered by the two dominant sensor network implementations in the market today, 
namely TinyOS and IEEE 802.15.4. Like other wireless networking technologies, the 
communications of sensor networks do not enjoy the benefits of physically protected data 
links, so the threat of interception by an adversary is always present. Hence, link layer 
security is an especially important consideration for wireless sensor networks. Chapter IV 
discusses the similarities and differences in the security architecture of TinyOS and IEEE 
802.15.4, as well as their strength and limitations. Where applicable, comparisons are 
made with IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN to highlight improvements and lessons learnt. 
Next, the design and implementation of a sensor network sniffer is described in 
Chapters V and VI. A sniffer is the quintessential tool for network analysis. But such a 
tool is presently lacking in today’s sensor network development kits. The current design 
is based on existing sensor network hardware and software components to enable a low-
cost sniffer implementation. Captured frames from a simple sensor network application 
are analyzed for the purpose of validation. 
3 
Finally, Chapter VII concludes with a summary of the key points of this thesis, 
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II. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF IEEE 802.15.4 
A. OVERVIEW 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard [11] (802.15.4) is also known as the Low Rate 
Wireless Personal Area Network (LR-WPAN). It is designed to be a low-cost, low-
complexity and short-range wireless communication network for applications with 
limited power and relaxed throughput requirements. Strictly speaking, 802.15.4 defines 
protocols not specifically for sensor networks, but for Wireless Personal Area Networks 
(WPAN). It is part of the WPAN family of standards that covers a personal operating 
space (POS) of typically 10 meters. But it has begun to attract strong interest from the 
sensor network community in using these protocols for sensor networks. 
An 802.15.4 network can operate in either a star or peer-to-peer (mesh) topology, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. Each node in the network can either be a Full-Function Device 
(FFD), or a Reduced-Function Device (RFD).  
The FFD embodies all the functionalities of an 802.15.4 device. It can operate in 
three roles: a PAN coordinator, a coordinator, or a device. An 802.15.4 network must 
include at least one FFD acting as the PAN coordinator in order for the network to form. 
On the other hand, an RFD is an extremely simple device that can talk only to an FFD. 
RFDs are useful for say, a light switch or a passive infrared sensor. Thus, in a typical 
sensor network, the “leaves” of the network can be visualized to be either RFDs or FFDs, 
while the gateway or router is an FFD. 
Each device in the 802.15.4 network can by addressed by either a 64-bit extended 
address, or a 16-bit short address. The former is the global unique address of the device, 
analogous to the 48-bit Ethernet address of network interface cards. The latter is a 
convenient shorthand in a network-specific setting. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of a Zigbee/802.15.4 network. The green links and nodes 
show the star topology, while the blue links and nodes show the mesh topology. 
Through appropriate routing nodes, star and mesh networks can interoperate. 
Source: [From 12]. 
 
B. RELATIONSHIP WITH ZIGBEE 
Zigbee [13] is often spoken in the same breath as 802.15.4. They are not the same, 
although Zigbee is designed to work in tandem with 802.15.4. Their relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
802.15.4 is based on the classic Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer 
model [14], where it defines the physical layer and the media access control layer. The 
physical layer contains the radio frequency transceiver along with its low-level control 
mechanism. The media access control layer forms part of the data link layer, and provides 
access to the physical channel for all types of transfer. This is the typical way that recent 
IEEE 802.x standards are specified. Its purpose is to provide a common and interoperable 
communications platform that higher layer protocols can leverage on. 
The higher layer protocols are defined by specific applications such as Zigbee. 
Zigbee builds on the 802.15.4’s physical and medium access control layers with a 
network layer and an application layer that manage routing, discovery, security, and other 
network-level functions. Of note, the security services provided by Zigbee include 
methods for key establishment, key transport, frame protection, and device management.  
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Figure 2: Relationship between Zigbee and 802.15.4. Note the separation point 
in the medium access control layer. 
Source: [From 12]. 
 
As such, the security provided by 802.15.4 can be considered to be link layer 
security primarily aimed at node-to-node security, while the security provided by Zigbee 
can be considered application layer security primarily aimed at end-to-end security. 
Zigbee security is thus analogous to SSH [15], SSL/TLS [16] and IPSec [17].  
In section 2.4 of his book [18], Stallings noted that with end-to-end security, the 
user data is secure, but the traffic pattern is not, since packet headers must be transmitted 
in the clear for the packet to be successfully routed to the destination. User data is 
therefore subjected to traffic analysis [19]. To achieve greater security, both link and end-
to-end security are needed. Hence, 802.15.4 security and Zigbee security should 
complement but not replace each other. 
Karlof, Sastry and Wagner [20] opined that the dominant traffic pattern in sensor 
networks is not end-to-end communication, but many-to-one communication, where in-
network processing such as aggregation and duplicate elimination is used to reduce 
network traffic and save energy. Since in-network processing requires each intermediate 
node to access, modify and suppress the contents of messages, the more appropriate 
security mechanism to study should be node-to-node security instead of end-to-end  
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security. For this reason, the analysis of the security of Zigbee stack is outside the scope 
of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is recognized that end-to-end security will still have value 
for security services like keying. 
The following sections discuss key components of the 802.15.4 security 
architecture. 
 
C. SECURITY SERVICES 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Telecommunication 
Standardization Section (ITU-T) Recommendation X.800 [21] defines four classes of 
layer 2 security services between communicating open systems, namely authentication, 
access control, message confidentiality, and message integrity. 802.15.4 uses the 
following terms for its security services: access control, data encryption, frame integrity, 
and sequential freshness. In this thesis, the more conventional terms of access control, 
message confidentiality, message integrity, and replay protection, respectively are 
adopted. 
802.15.4 provides all four of these services, but only three of them are specified in 
the standard, namely access control, message confidentiality and message integrity. Peer 
entity authentication is embedded in message integrity. In addition, an optional fourth 
security service, replay protection, is provided by 802.15.4, although one may say that it 
can be considered part of message integrity too.  
1. Access Control 
Access control provides the ability for a device to select the other devices with 
which it is willing to communicate. At the same time, it also prevents unauthorized 
parties from participating in the network. In 802.15.4, access control is implemented by 
an access control list (ACL) that each device maintains for the nodes that it is willing to 
communicate with. The ACL is explained in more details later. 
2. Message Confidentiality 
Message confidentiality means keeping information secret from unauthorized 
observation. In 802.15.4, message confidentiality is achieved through a symmetric cipher, 
using a key shared by a group of devices (typically stored as the default key) or using a 
key shared between two peers (typically stored in an individual ACL entry). Message 
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confidentiality may be provided on beacon payloads, command payloads, and data 
payloads, but not on acknowledgement payloads. 
3. Message Integrity 
Message integrity means protecting the data from unauthorized modification. In 
802.15.4, message integrity is achieved by using a message authentication code (MAC). 
802.15.4 refers to the message authentication code as a message integrity code (MIC) in 
order to differentiate it from the media access control layer, which also abbreviates to 
MAC. This is beginning to become the convention used in recent IEEE standards. In this 
thesis, however, the cryptographic convention of using MAC as an abbreviation for 
message authentication code is adhered to. To avoid any confusion, media access control 
is not abbreviated.  
 A MAC is a key-dependent one-way hash function [22] that is applied over the 
entire packet, including the packet headers. The key used to compute the MAC is the 
same key used for data confidentiality. Since the MAC depends on the key, the MAC 
further provides peer entity authenticity. The MAC may be provided on beacon frames, 
command frames, and data frames, but not on acknowledgement frames. Note the 
distinction between frame and payload. Encryption is applied to the packet payload, 
while MAC is applied to the entire frame, including the headers. 
4. Replay Protection (optional) 
Replay protection uses an ordered sequence of inputs to detect and reject frames 
that have been replayed. The sender assigns a monotonically increasing sequence number 
to every outgoing packet, and the receiver rejects packets with sequence numbers smaller 
than the one it has already received. A receiver can optionally enable replay protection 
when encryption is enabled. 
 
D. SECURITY SUITES 
802.15.4 provides the security services via a set of pre-defined security suites (see 
Table 1). These security suites will only be used when the application specifies that the 
device shall operate in secured mode. 
A security suite consists of a set of operations to perform on medium access 
control layer frames. The security suite name indicates the symmetric cryptography 
10 
algorithm, mode, and integrity code bit length. The encryption algorithm used is 
Advanced Encryption Standard [23] (AES). The only mandatory security suite that each 
device that implements security shall support is the AES-CCM-64 security suite [11]. 
  
 Security Services  







NONE     No security 
AES-CTR X X  X 
Encryption only with 
AES with counter (CTR) 
mode 
AES-CCM-128 X X X X 
AES-CCM-64 X X X X 
AES-CCM-32 X X X X 
Encryption with AES 
with counter mode, and 
authentication with CBC-
MAC [24] 
AES-CBC-MAC-128 X  X  
AES-CBC-MAC-64 X  X  
AES-CBC-MAC-32 X  X  
Authentication only with 
CBC-MAC 
Table 1: IEEE 802.15.4 security suites. The only mandatory security suite that 
each device that implements security shall support is AES-CCM-64 [11]. 
 
E. ACCESS CONTROL LIST (ACL) 
The media access controller maintains a single default ACL entry and an ACL 
table. The default ACL entry is known by every device in the PAN and is used in 
situations in which the device needs to communicate with a second device or with 
multiple devices that it may not know individually. It is analogous to a broadcast or group 
key. This default ACL entry indicates whether default security is to be applied to devices 
not in the ACL, and if so, the default security suite and security material to use. The 
default security suite specified in the standard is none, with an empty string for the 
security material. 
Individual ACL entries in the ACL table are used in situations in which the device 
shares a key with a specific known device. This implies a trusted relationship has been 
established between these two devices. Therefore, each ACL entry corresponds to a 
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trusted device, and consists of its PAN identifier, its 64 bit extended address, its 16 bit 
short address (or 0xffff if this address is not known), and its security suite and related 
security material. When replay protection is enabled, the security material includes a high 
water mark of the most recently received sequence number. There can be a maximum of 
255 entries in the ACL table. 
 
F. MODE OF OPERATION 
The media access controller can be set in one of three security modes, namely 
unsecured mode, ACL mode, and secured mode. Unsecured mode is self-explanatory. 
ACL mode does not perform any cryptographic operations on the frames, but provides 
only a means for the device to indicate to the application whether the frame comes from a 
device in the ACL table. Secured mode utilizes the ACL functionality and also provides 
cryptographic protection on incoming and outgoing frames. 
When the media access controller receives a packet from the application to send 
in secured mode, the ACL is consulted to find an entry that matches the destination 
address of the packet. If there is a match, the security material in the ACL entry is used to 
encrypt and/or authenticate the packet, according on the security suite specified in the 
ACL entry. If there is no match, then the default ACL entry is checked to see if default 
security is to be applied. If this setting is true, then the default security suite and security 
material is used to process the packet. Note that this can mean no security. Otherwise, the 
media access controller reports an error to the application. 
On packet reception, the media access controller consults a flag in the packet 
header to determine if any of the security suites have been applied to the packet. If no 
security has been applied, the packet is passed on to the application as is. Otherwise, a 
process similar to the sending process is used, but this time based on the source address. 
If replay protection is enabled, the media access controller also verifies that the sequence 
number of the packet is greater than the one stored at the corresponding ACL entry. If it 
is, the ACL entry is updated with the new sequence number as the new high water mark. 
Otherwise, an error is reported to the application. 
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G. NONCE OR INITIALIZATION VECTOR (IV) 
An important aspect of data confidentiality is semantic security [25]. It means that 
besides preventing plaintext recovery, the encryption scheme should also prevent 
adversaries from learning even partial information about the plaintext. One implication of 
semantic security is that encrypting the same plaintext twice must result in two different 
ciphertexts. A common technique to achieve this is to use a nonce, or more commonly 
called the initialization vector (IV), as a side input to the cipher in addition to the key. So 
long as the IV is unique for each encrypted packet, then no two packets can be encrypted 
to the same ciphertext, even if they have the same data, which is not an uncommon 
situation in computer networking. Since the receiver must use the IV to decrypt 
messages, the security of most encryption schemes do not rely on the IV being secret. 
Hence, the IV is typically sent in the clear with the encrypted packet. The IV is often a 
monotonically increasing large number. Another strategy to generate IV is to randomly 
choose from an n-bit value. But by the birthday paradox, it is likely that the first 
repetition will occur after 2n/2 packets have been sent. On the other hand, if the IV is 
chosen from an n-bit counter, then the first repetition will not occur before 2n+1 packets 
have been sent. Hence, the later strategy is often the more popular. 
In 802.15.4, the IV is constructed from the following data: a static flags field, the 
64 bit extended address, a 4 byte frame counter, a 1 byte key counter, and a 2 byte block 
counter (See Figure 3). 
 
1 byte 8 bytes 4 bytes 1 byte 2 bytes 
Flags Source Address Frame counter Key Counter Block Counter 
Figure 3: Format of the 802.15.4 IV for AES-CTR security suite [11]. 
 
There is a cryptographic requirement that the same IV must not be used to encrypt 
two different packets with the same key. Otherwise, it is possible to recover information 




C1 = AES(IV,K) ⊕ P1 
C2 = AES(IV,K) ⊕ P2 
C1 ⊕ C2 = AES(IV,K) ⊕ P1 ⊕ AES(IV,K) ⊕ P2 = P1 ⊕ P2 
 
Given the well-known structure of network messages, recovering the XOR of the 
two plaintexts makes it significantly easier to recover the two plaintexts. 
The frame counter and key counter are key (pun unintended) in ensuring that this 
will not be the case. The frame counter is maintained by the media access controller, 
while the key counter is controlled by the application. The media access controller 
increments the frame counter for every encrypted packet sent. When the frame counter 
reaches the maximum value and rolls over, the media access controller notifies the 
application with an error. The application must increment the key counter to continue 
encrypting packets.  
When both the frame counter and key counter are exhausted, no further 
encryption is possible with this key, until a new key is established. 
Instead of sending the entire IV with the encrypted payload, only the frame 
counter and key counter are pre-pended to the encrypted payload and sent in the clear. 
The rest of the fields of the IV can be derived from the packet. 
In previous sections, a sequence number that is used in replay protection has been 
alluded to. In 802.15.4, this sequence number is the five byte value constructed from the 
concatenation of the frame counter and the key counter. 
 
H.        SUMMARY 
The basic security architecture of 802.15.4 was presented. A distinction has been 
made between application-layer security offered by Zigbee, and the link-layer security 
offered by 802.15.4. The discussion includes its security services and security suites, as 
well as its mode of operation, and the specification of the access control list and 
initialization vector. Overall, 802.15.4 has a comprehensive set of services to enable 
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secure link-layer communications in sensor networks. In the next chapter, the security 
architecture of TinyOS will be presented. 
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III. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF TINYOS 
A. OVERVIEW 
TinyOS is a popular research platform for sensor networks, frequently used in 
conjunction with the Crossbow motes [27] as the preferred microprocessor and radio 
hardware. From its website [28], 
TinyOS is an open-source operating system designed for wireless 
embedded sensor networks. It features a component-based architecture 
which enables rapid innovation and implementation while minimizing 
code size as required by the severe memory constraints inherent in sensor 
networks. TinyOS's component library includes network protocols, 
distributed services, sensor drivers, and data acquisition tools – all of 
which can be used as-is or be further refined for a custom application. 
TinyOS's event-driven execution model enables fine-grained power 
management yet allows the scheduling flexibility made necessary by the 
unpredictable nature of wireless communication and physical world 
interfaces. 
The topology of a sensor network based on TinyOS devices depends entirely on 
the application and the networking stack used. A TinyOS application, and indeed parts of 
TinyOS itself, is programmed in an object-oriented componentized C language extension, 
called nesC [29]. For example, Surge is a popular mesh networking stack. For Surge-
based applications, the topology is similar to one based on 802.15.4, but it does not have 
an implicit hierarchy of nodes like 802.15.4 does.  
A TinyOS device is addressed by a 16-bit address, augmented with an 8-bit group 
ID. The group ID is analogous to the network address for a group of cooperating nodes. It 
allows multiple distinct groups of motes to share the same radio channel. In addition, 
TinyOS implements the Active Message (AM) system. AM types are analogous to port 
numbers in TCP/IP. Each TinyOS packet includes an 8-bit AM type in the header (see 
Figure 4).  
Early versions of TinyOS did not have security built in at all. In late 2004, the 
developers of TinyOS introduced TinySec [30], a lightweight generic link layer security 
package that developers can easily integrate into their TinyOS applications. The authors 
foresee that TinySec will cover the basic security needs of all but the most security 
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critical applications. To enable TinySec in TinyOS, the application needs to specify 
TINYSEC=true on the command line to make, or in the Makefile. Unfortunately, at 
this moment, TinySec only works in the TOSSIM simulator and the Mica and Mica2 
motes [38]. It has not yet been ported to the MicaZ and Telos motes. 
Since the main focus of this thesis is on security, henceforth, when the term 
“TinyOS” is used, it is meant to be TinyOS with TinySec enabled. 
The following paragraphs discuss the key components of the TinyOS security 
architecture. Because TinyOS is not a formal specification like 802.15.4, there is no 
official documentation on TinySec. Almost all the information discussed here is taken 
from [20,30,38] and the TinyOS source code, which can be downloaded from [28]. 
 
B. SECURITY SERVICES 
The security provided by TinyOS centers on message integrity and message 
confidentiality. As in 802.15.4, peer entity authenticity is embedded in message integrity 
through the use of a MAC. Unlike 802.15.4, however, TinyOS does not explicitly provide 
access control via an ACL.  
TinyOS supports two security options: authenticated-encryption (TinySec-AE) 
and authentication-only (TinySec-Auth). The former encrypts the data payload, then 
computes the MAC over the packet header and encrypted payload. The latter does not 
encrypt the data payload, but only computes the MAC over the packet header and data 
payload. The default security mode of a TinySec-enabled application is TinySec-Auth. 
The TinySec mode is indicated in the upper 2 bits (MSB) of the length field of the packet 
header. This modification is harmless because the maximum size of the data field in a 
TinyOS packet is 29 bytes, i.e., at most 5 bits of the length field will be used. 
It can be seen from Figure 4 that the TinyOS and the TinySec-Auth packets do 
not have a field for the source address. So it is impossible for the receiver to know where 
the packet came from. Source address is only included in the TinySec-AE packet, and 
that was primarily for the benefit of increasing the diversity of the IV. Hence, if an 




Figure 4: TinyOS packet formats. The byte sizes of the fields are indicated in 
parentheses. The shaded fields are protected by the MAC. Note that the Group field 
is omitted from the TinySec packet formats – group membership is implicit in the 
knowledge of the secret key [20]. 
 
C. SECURITY PRIMITIVES 
1. Message Authentication Codes (MAC) 
As in 802.15.4, TinySec uses the cipher block chaining construct, CBC-MAC 
[24], for computing and verifying MACs. The MAC is 32-bit long, and is computed over 
the headers as well as payload of the packet. The authentication key is 64 bits long. 
While the security of the MAC is directly related to the length of the MAC, the 
developers argued in that given the expected low data rate of the sensor network, a 32-bit 
MAC may provide an adequate level of security against blind forgeries. Adversaries 
cannot determine off-line if he has successfully forged a valid MAC for a particular 
message, hence any forgery attempts will be “blind”. For example, if an adversary tries to 
flood a 19.2 kb/s channel with blind forgery attempts, it may take him over 20 months to 
succeed, notwithstanding the fact that he would have effectively conducted a denial-of-
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Furthermore, sustained forgery attempts can be pre-empted through simple 
heuristics. For example, nodes can signal the base station when the rate of MAC failures 
exceeds some reasonable threshold. Such countermeasures would mitigate the need for a 
longer MAC. Unfortunately, TinyOS leaves the implementation of such countermeasures 
to the application. 
2. Encryption Scheme 
The default cipher used in TinyOS is Skipjack in 64-bit cipher block chaining 
(CBC) mode, in conjunction with an eight byte IV, using a 64-bit encryption key. RC5 is 
also feasible. These two ciphers were found to be most appropriate for software 
implementation on embedded microcontroller as far as implementation efficiency and 
performance are concerned. The TinyOS source code includes implementation for both 
Skipjack and RC5. AES was later deemed to be equally suitable as well. 
The choice of using CBC mode over stream cipher was primarily because with 
regards to semantic security, CBC mode is believed to degrade more gracefully when IV 
reuse occurs. This is an important consideration for TinyOS, because between two 
communicating nodes, the IV could be as small as a 16-bit value. If the IV is long enough 
so that it is not expected to repeat in a long time, then a stream cipher like AES-CTR 
performs much better. An additional advantage is that the same block cipher code can be 
used for the message authentication code (CBC-MAC), thus saving considerable code 
space. 
3. Initialization Vectors (IV) 
As in 802.15.4, the encryption scheme uses an IV to achieve semantic security. 
The format of the IV is shown in Figure 4a. The first four bytes of the IV are borrowed 
from the existing header fields of the TinyOS packet: the destination address, the AM 
type, and the length of the packet. The last four bytes are comprised of the source address 
and a 16-bit counter. The counter is initialized to zero, then incremented by one after 
every message sent.  
The last four bytes of the IV is chosen in this way to maximize the number of 
packets each node can send before there is a global repetition of the IV. That is, each 
node can send at least 216 packets before IV reuse occurs. For a network of n nodes, this 
results in n.216 packets before IV reuse occurs in the network.  
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The developers felt that this IV design should provide adequate security. Since 
sensor networks must conserve power to be long-lived, the average packet rate in most 
sensor networks will be very low – on the order of one packet per minute. At one packet 
per minute, IV reuse will not occur for over 45 days.  In addition, the selection of CBC 
encryption mode further mitigates the risk of information leakage when IV reuse occurs. 
In short, information may only leak when one node sends two different packets with the 




The basic security design of the TinyOS, or more specifically TinySec, was 
presented. The security provided by TinyOS centers on message integrity and message 
confidentiality. Peer entity authenticity is embedded in message integrity through the use 
of a MAC. On the other hand, TinyOS does not explicitly provide access control via an 
ACL. There are 2 security modes: authenticated-encryption, and authenticated only. 
Security primitives such as message authentication codes, encryption scheme and 
initialization vector has also been discussed. With the background information on 
802.15.4 and TinyOS now in place, the next chapter will discuss their similarities, 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF 802.15.4 AND TINYOS SECURITY 
In this chapter, the similarities and differences between the security designs of 
802.15.4 and TinyOS will be examined, and their strength and limitations discussed. 
Where applicable, lessons learned from another wireless standard,  IEEE 802.11 Wireless 
LAN [31] (802.11), will be applied to assess the adequacies of 802.15.4 and TinyOS 
security. 
 
A. MODULARITY VS OPTIMIZATION 
The objectives of 802.15.4 and TinyOS are very similar: ease of deployment, 
reliability and robustness, short-range operations, extremely low cost, and long battery 
life. But they are quite different in the way they are architected. The contrast can be 
summarized as Modularity versus Optimization. 
802.15.4 follows the tried-and-tested layered protocol approach of the seven-layer 
OSI model. 802.15.4 specifies the lower 2 layers, namely physical and media access 
control. In this regard, it is very similar to 802.11. The inherent modularity of this model 
allows powerful higher layer specifications like Zigbee to export their own services, 
which applications can easily take advantage of. The downside is added code complexity, 
memory overhead, and processing delay in the handling of packets as they traverse the 
layers – a luxury that some sensor network applications can ill afford. 
On the other hand, TinyOS resembles more of a toolkit or library for fast 
prototyping of sensor network applications. The OS is built-in to abstract the underlying 
hardware and support an event-driven framework. Unlike 802.15.4, TinyOS is tailor-
made for sensor networks, and targets devices with limited memory and power. Many of 
the design decisions were made under the constraints of significant resource limitations. 
Betweem the two, TinyOS would easily offer a more optimized and energy efficient 
sensor network solution. The cost to pay for this optimization is the loss of some 
implementation transparency, the ability to modularize the solution, and perhaps some 
degree of assurances especially for applications where security is critical. 
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It should be noted that 802.15.4 is intended for hardware implementation on a 
dedicated radio chip, while TinyOS does not require dedicated hardware. The developers 
of TinyOS do not see this as a handicap. They claim that with sufficient engineering 
efforts, it is possible to encrypt and authenticate all communications entirely in software 
without major performance degradation. This result is a testament to the optimization 
possible in TinyOS. 
As of today, the only radio chip that claims to be fully 802.15.4 compliant is the 
Chipcon CC2420 (CC2420) [32,33], currently used in Crossbow’s MicaZ and the TelosB 
motes. It operates in the 2.4 GHz frequency band with a data rate of 250 kbps. 
 
B. KEYING MECHANISM AND IV 
Neither 802.15.4 nor TinyOS addresses the issue of the keying, that is the manner 
in which keys are generated, distributed, and securely stored (or destroyed). Section 
5.4.6.1 in [11] states, 
the security mechanisms in this standard are symmetric-key based using 
keys provided by higher layer processes. The management and 
establishment of these keys is the responsibility of the implementer. The 
security provided by these mechanisms assume[s] the keys are generated, 
transmitted, and stored in a secure manner. 
Given that keying is generally considered a higher layer service, this position is 
understandable. But keying has a critical inter-dependency with one aspect of link layer 
security: the IV. Recall that to achieve semantic security, a node must not use the same 
IV with the same key for encryption. This is especially true when the IV is used with a 
stream ciphers like AES-CTR used by 802.15.4, or RC4 used by 802.11. 802.11 used a 
woefully inadequate 24-bit IV. On a network with a moderate load, this IV space was 
exhausted within a few hours. When there are multiple hosts within the wireless network, 
the situation is exacerbated since they all share the same encryption key.  
Both 802.15.4 and TinyOS learned this lesson: 802.15.4 uses a much longer IV, 
up to 40 bits. While TinyOS limits itself to a shorter IV, it tries to mitigate the risk of 
information leakage through the use of CBC encryption mode rather than naively use a 
stream cipher. 
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Table 2 illustrates the theoretical IV reuse periods for TinyOS and 802.15.4 
between 2 communicating nodes for the various data rates shown. The packet sizes 
chosen are the maximum packet sizes, so that if the actual packets are smaller, then the 
IV reuse periods will be shorter than those shown. The IV length of 40 bits for 802.15.4 
assumes both the frame counter (4 bytes) and the key counter (1 byte) are in use. 
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Table 2: IV reuse periods for TinyOS and 802.15.4 between two 
communicating nodes. 
 
It can be seen from the table that in the worse case, i.e., 100% duty cycle, it will 
take a matter of minutes in TinyOS for IV reuse to occur, while it will take hundreds of 
years for 802.15.4. Even in the optimistic case of one packet per minute, it will take 
slightly more than 45 days in TinyOS for IV reuse to occur, while it will take more than 2 
million years for 802.15.4. 
This implies that for TinyOS to avoid IV reuse, a new key will have to be 
established every 45 days. In practice, one may re-key well before that period runs out. 
On the other hand, re-keying may not even be an issue for 802.15.4, since the IV reuse 
period will be longer than the lifetime of almost all applications.  
It is stated here that the IV length of TinyOS is 16 bits. This warrants some 
discussion. On paper, TinyOS states that the IV is 8 bytes (see Figure 4a). But between 
two communicating nodes, only the last 2 bytes will be constantly variable. The 
destination address, source address and AM type are most likely fixed. Theoretically, the 
length field may also be variable, but most sensory messages will be fixed length, or have 
low variances in their lengths. Hence, it can be concluded that the IV length is effectively 
only 16 bits. 
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Even if a constantly varying length field is taken into consideration, it will only 
add five bits to the IV, not eight bits, because the maximum data field size is 29 bytes. 
This translates into a 32 times increase in the IV reuse period. For the optimistic case of 
one packet per second, it becomes a more respectable 4 years. But in the worst case, it is 
still only in the order of hours. 
To be fair, it was a conscious design decision by the developers of TinySec to 
choose a 16-bit IV, and accept that IV reuse will occur, because a longer IV was deemed 
to add unacceptable overhead to the TinyOS packet size. Thus, CBC mode was 
specifically chosen because of its robustness to information leakage when IVs repeat. In 
short, information only leaks when two packets with the same first 8 bytes and IV are 
sent, assuming the rest of the fields are identical.  
In summary, the long IV length of 802.15.4 means that the IV is unlikely to be 
exhausted in the lifetime of any application. Hence 802.15.4 applications can get away 
with not having to contend with re-keying issues. On the other hand, the short IV length 
combined with CBC mode may be sufficient security for most TinyOS applications. For 
applications requiring higher assurances, however, either a robust re-keying mechanism 
must be used, or TinyOS’s IV must be customized to a longer length. 
 
C. ACCESS CONTROL 
802.11 did not specify a mechanism for access control within the wireless 
network. Most vendors choose to implement Ethernet address-based access control list at 
the access point. Unfortunately, the Ethernet address alone does not provide a strong 
enough identity. Attackers can sniff Ethernet addresses wirelessly and then spoof them 
via software [36] to impersonate legitimate clients. Encrypting the wireless traffic via a 
shared key may exclude adversaries without the key, but once the key is compromised, 
the adversary will again be able to impersonate any legitimate client. 
Access control is an important consideration in sensor networks, because sensor 
network nodes are susceptible to physical capture. Therefore if the access control of the 
network is based on a single shared key, then once a node is captured and the key 
compromised, the access control for the entire network fails. The remaining sensor nodes 
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may have to be recovered and securely re-keyed with a new shared key – not always a 
feasible course of action. On the other hand, if the access control is based on pair-wise 
keys, then capturing a node will just violate the access control relationship with its peers, 
not the entire network. If a node is suspected of being captured, the network can simply 
instruct the captured node’s immediate peers to expel the node from their access control 
list. There is no need to re-key the entire network. Hence, access control via an ACL with 
pair-wise keying should be the preferred access control mechanism for sensor networks. 
TinyOS enforces access control with a MAC computed from a network-wide 
shared key. On the other hand, 802.15.4 can potentially offer very fine-grained access 
control. Each device can hold up to 255 entries in its ACL table, one for each trusted 
peer. Each trust relationship can have its individual security settings; authenticate-only, 
encrypt-only, or authenticate-encrypt. 
An interesting scenario arises when an FFD is physically captured. In this case, an 
attacker can make use of the captured FFD to impersonate as a PAN coordinator, thus 
potentially routing all traffic through it. One way to mitigate this threat is to ensure that 
the edge devices that are susceptible to physical capture are only RFDs. Another way is 
to employ countermeasures to detect unauthorized or duplicate PAN coordinators. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the 802.15.4 specification does not make it 
mandatory to support the full 255 entries in the ACL table, and in the manner that the 
specification describes. Figure 5 shows the CC2420 RAM memory map. It can be seen 
that the CC2420 does not have an ACL table. Instead, it has 2 keys. The application may 
choose to use one for transmit and the other for receive, or use a single key for both 
transmit and receive. These keys do not have an address associated with them. Therefore, 
these keys are more akin to the default ACL entry in the 802.15.4 specifications, and can 




Figure 5: Chipcon CC2420 RAM memory map. 
Source: [From 33] 
 
D. MESSAGE INTEGRITY 
In 802.11, message integrity is only protected by a CRC-32 checksum, even when 
WEP is turn on. Researchers have shown that it is possible to modify WEP encrypted 
packets in transit without detection, because the CRC checksum is an unkeyed function 
of the message [37]. The fix is to use a cryptographically secure MAC. 
Both 802.15.4 and TinyOS uses a MAC to protect the integrity of their encrypted 
messages. It is an accepted wisdom that the security of the MAC is directly related to the 
length of the MAC. 802.15.4 applications can use up to 128-bit MAC. CC2420 supports 
128-bit MAC only. This is clearly superior to TinyOS’s 32-bit MAC. TinyOS 
applications requiring higher assurances should implement countermeasures to prevent an 
attacker from making too many blind forgery attempts. 
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E. ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 
The notable difference between the encryption schemes of 802.15.4 and TinyOS, 
is that 802.15.4 uses a stream cipher, AES-CTR, and a long IV to avoid the issue of IV 
reuse, while TinyOS uses a 64-bit block cipher in CBC mode with a shorter IV to 
mitigate the risk of information leakage associated with IV reuse. The key length of AES 
can be up to 128 bits long, and CC2420 has hardware cryptographic support for 128-bit 
keys only. It is reasonable to conclude that 802.15.4 should provide a higher degree of 
assurance as far as message confidentiality is concerned. 
Note that TinyOS does not have an encrypt-only mode. This is no great loss. 
From the discussion in the previous section, the integrity of an encrypted packet cannot 
be guaranteed by its CRC checksum. A corollary is that encryption should not be used 
without a MAC if its integrity needs to be guaranteed. Hence, TinyOS only supports 
authenticate-only and authenticate-encrypt. Researchers have cautioned against using 
802.15.4’s AES-CTR security suite [9]. They argued that a simple, single-packet denial-
of-service (DoS) attack can be mounted on a 802.15.4 network that uses the AES-CTR 
security suite with replay protection enabled. 
 
F. REPLAY PROTECTION 
TinyOS explicitly omitted replay protection in the security architecture. The main 
reason is to avoid the extra memory needed to keep the sequence numbers for every node 
that a receiver communicates with. Another reason is that the developers believe that 
replay protection is better and more efficiently handled by the application, which has 
more intimate knowledge of the overall topology and communications pattern of the 
network. 
It is generally a good idea to have replay protection in link layer security. 802.11 
did not have replay protection; hence, messages could be intercepted and replayed 
without modification. The result can be denial-of-service attacks, or it can be used as a 
launching pad for other attacks, like the man-in-the-middle attacks. 
802.15.4 specifies optional replay protection. On paper, peer-to-peer replay 
protection should work very well under the specification. But researchers have found that 
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network shared keying using the default ACL entry to be incompatible with replay 
protection. This is because the receiver can only keep a single sequence number in the 
default ACL entry as the high water mark while receiving packets from many sources, 
each maintaining their own sequence numbers. 
It must be pointed out that, as can be seen from Figure 5, CC2420 does not have 
provision for a replay counter in its RAM memory space. So any replay protection will 
have to be implemented in the application space – just like TinyOS. Therefore, one can 
conclude that replay protection is currently absent from today’s sensor network link layer 
security, until another radio chip comes along that supports this important feature. 
 
G. SUMMARY 
The security of 802.15.4 and TinyOS was analyzed and compared in five broad 
categories: IV length, access control, message integrity, encryption scheme, and replay 
protection. In general, 802.15.4 offers higher assurance in terms of cryptographic 
strength, message integrity, and information leakage from IV reuse. TinyOS applications 
will need robust re-keying support and countermeasures against forgery attempts to make 
up the difference.  But they both lack effective peer-level access control and replay 
protection – both important aspects of sensor network security. 
To validate this security analysis, a sensor network sniffer is needed. A sniffer is 
the quintessential tool for modern day network and security analysis. But such a tool is 
presently lacking in today’s sensor network development kits. In the following chapters, 
the design and implementation of a TinyOS sensor network sniffer will be presented. 
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V. ANATOMY OF THE TINYOS SNIFFER 
In the previous chapters, the link-layer security design of TinyOS and 802.15.4 
was described and analyzed. To validate the analysis, we need to use a sensor network 
sniffer. A sniffer is the quintessential tool for network analysis. But such a tool is 
presently lacking in today’s sensor network development kits. In the following chapters, 
we will present the design and implementation of a TinyOS sensor network sniffer. The 
current design is based on existing sensor network hardware and software components to 
enable a low-cost sniffer implementation. 
To understand how the sniffer works, it is necessary to first understand how 
TinyOS handles incoming network messages, and hence the hardware and software 
components necessary to implement such a sniffer. 
 
A. TINYOS FILTERING MECHANISM 
A TinyOS packet has the format shown in Figure 4c. The fields of interest are the 
following: 
1. Destination Address 
The destination address refers to the 16-bit node address of the mote. It is 
programmed into the mote along with the TinyOS application when the following 
command is issued: 
make <platform>  re|install,<n> <programmer>,<port> 
where <n> is the 16-bit node address. The address 0 is typically reserved for the 
base station mote. 
2. Group ID 
The group ID is analogous to the network address for a group of cooperating 
motes. It allows multiple distinct groups of motes to share the same radio channel. The 
group ID can be set by defining the preprocessor symbol DEFAULT_LOCAL_GROUP. For 
example, this symbol can be located in the MakeXbowlocal file in the tinyos-
1.x/contrib/xbow/apps directory. This file is automatically included in the 
compilation of almost all TinyOS programs in the tinyos-1.x/contrib/xbow/apps 
directory. The default group ID is 0x7D. 
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3. AM Type 
TinyOS implements the Active Message (AM) system. AM types are analogous 
to port numbers in TCP/IP. Different applications may use different AM types. For 




  AM_SURGEMSG = 17 
}; 
 
TinyOS automatically filters incoming packets by matching the destination 
address in the packet header with the node address of the mote. If the node address is 0, 
then TinyOS skips this step – the mote is effectively operating in promiscuous mode. If 
the destination address matches the node address, then the entire packet, including the 
header, is passed on to the application. It is the application’s responsibility to handle the 
group ID and AM fields. 
In summary, a TinyOS sniffer can simply be a mote programmed with a node 
address of 0, and an application that ignores the group ID and AM fields (assuming no a-
priori knowledge of either of them). 
 
B. COMPONENTS OF THE SNIFFER 
The TinyOS sniffer is based on readily available hardware and software 
components, and a Java-based application analogous to tcpdump [39]. 
1. Hardware components 
The hardware platform is simply an off-the-shelf mote connected to a PC. The 
traditional connection is via the MIB510 programming board to a PC’s serial port. The 
TelosB mote offers a more convenient on-board USB connector that plugs directly into 
the PC for both the power and serial connections; hence, a more compact solution (see 
Figure 6). Connecting via the MIB510 would require not only an external serial cable, but 
also an external power supply for the MIB510 programming board. However, the 
message format forwarded by a Mica, MicaZ, or TelosB mote is quite different. So the 





Figure 6 TelosB mote connected to the USB port of a PC. 
 
2. Software Components  
The software consists of one TinyOS application, TransparentBase, and two Java 
applications, SerialForwarder and Sniffer. 
TransparentBase is one of the many examples of TinyOS applications that can be 
found in the tinyos-1.x/apps directory. It acts as a simple bidirectional bridge between 
the serial and radio links. TransparentBase has the additional property that it ignores the 
Group ID. Programming the TelosB mote with TransparentBase and a node address of 0 
gives a promiscuous receiver receiving TinyOS packets from the MicaZ sensor network, 
and forwarding them to the PC via the serial link. So long as no data is sent to the serial 
link, TransparentBase will also be a unidirectional passive receiver. 
As mentioned earlier, it is the responsibility of the TinyOS application to handle 
the filtering of group ID and AM type. TransparentBase ignores both the group ID and 
AM type fields, so Group ID and AM filtering is not a problem. 
At this point, this is pretty much have a functional TinyOS sniffer mote. Next, an 
application is needed to communicate with the mote via the serial port. In TinyOS world, 
the standard way to this is to use SerialForwarder. 
SerialForwarder is a Java application that can be found in the tinyos 
/tools/java/net/tinyos directory. SerialForwarder runs on the PC and instantiates a 
network server that forwards TinyOS packets read from the serial port to a network port, 
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and vice versa. Typically, it is used to allow applications to communicate with the mote 
via a network interface instead of a serial interface – this is especially useful for 
distributed network clients, or Java clients like Surge. 
The final piece of the puzzle is an application that reads the packet from Serial 
Forwarder, extracts the protocol and application information, and outputs the information 
in a usable form. There is no such tool in current TinyOS development kits. For this 
reason, the Java application Sniffer has been developed. The design and implementation 
of Sniffer will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Figure 7  illustrates the block diagram of the sniffer. 
 
Figure 7 Block diagram of TinyOS Sniffer. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The TinyOS packet filtering mechanism was discussed, and explained how it can 
be used for the purpose of frame capture. The necessary hardware and software 
components of a TinyOS sniffer was also presented. However, an application, 
Sniffer.java, is still needed that reads the packet from Serial Forwarder, extracts the 
protocol and application information, and outputs the information in a usable form. This 
will be discussed in the next chapter 
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VI. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SNIFFER 
APPLICATION 
In addition to the analysis of the security architectures of 802.15.4 and TinyOS, 
the main development effort in this thesis is the design and implementation of Sniffer. 
This is a multi-threaded, tcpdump-like application that reads raw packets from Serial 
Forwarder, extracts the protocol and application layer information, and outputs it in a 
usable form. 
The developmental paradigm of TinyOS is that mote applications running on the 
motes are written in nesC, while user applications running on the PC are written in Java. 
Keeping in line with this paradigm, Sniffer is also written in Java. 
The remainder of this chapter explains the Sniffer application in more details. To 
follow the discussion, some working knowledge of Java is assumed, e.g. how to run Java 
programs, what are Java classes etc.  
 
A. USAGE 
Sniffer is a command line tool with usage as follows: 
 
usage: java Sniffer [-m mica|micaz|telos] [-h host] [-ob filename] 
[-?] [-p port] [-l filename] [-oc filename] 
-m <mica|micaz|telos> Specifies TOS message format when auto-
detection fails. 
-?    Print this help text. 
-h <host> The host running Serial Forwarder. Can be 
a valid hostname or IP address. Default is 
local host. 
-l <filename>           Log screen output to file. 
-ob <filename>          Output to file in raw binary format. 
-oc <filename>          Output to file in CSV format. 
-p <port> Network port used by Serial Forwarder. 
Default is 9001. 
 
The meaning of some of these options will become clear as the implementation of 




Figure 8 Process flow chart for Sniffer. 
 
B. PROCESS FLOW 
The process flow of Sniffer is depicted in Figure 8. The program first parses the 
command line to determine the user specified options, and exits upon detecting invalid 
options, or if “-?” is specified to display the help text. Once the options are set, the 
program attempts to instantiate a PacketServer class and initialize the Writer class with 
the registered outputs. If either of these fails, for example due to a failure to communicate 
with a SerialForwarder source, or a file I/O error, the program exits. 
At this point, the program is ready to enter into its main processing loop. First, it 
requests a packet from PacketServer. Then it passes the packet to the Protocol and AM 
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classes in sequence to process the protocol and application layer information respectively. 
Finally, the processed packet is passed to the Writer class for output to the screen, and is 
optionally written to file in a variety of formats if the user so specifies. The process loop 
continues indefinitely until the user terminates with Ctrl-C. 
 
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJOR JAVA CLASSES 
The Java classes that are implemented for Sniffer, and their relationships to each 
other, are depicted by the unified modeling language (UML) diagram in Figure 9. Note 
two exceptions. Firstly, the Thread super-class is a system provided class. It is included 
in the illustration to highlight the fact that Sniffer is a multi-threaded application. 
Secondly, the CLI utility library from the Apache Jakarta Commons project [40], not 
shown in the illustration, is used to provide the API for working with command line 
arguments and options. The user has to ensure that the CLI library is located in the Java 
CLASSPATH. 
The Sniffer class contains the main function of Sniffer. This is the entry point of 
the program, and implements the process flow illustrated in Figure 8. In addition, it keeps 
track of packets received as well as packets with protocol processing errors. This 
information is displayed on the screen when the user terminates the program with Ctrl-C. 
It is useful to look at the UML diagram in the following way. The leftmost branch 
consisting of the PacketServer class and its children comprise the input subsystem. The 
middle branches consisting of the Protocol and AM classes comprise the processing 
subsystem, while the rightmost branch consisting of the Writer class and its children 
comprise the output subsystem. Underpinning these subsystems is a collection of data 
classes called Packet and Field. 
The data classes, and the input, processing and output subsystems are now 






Figure 9 UML diagram of Sniffer. 
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1. Data Classes 
In order to capture the representation of a packet accurately as it is processed 
through the program, Sniffer defines a Field class and a Packet class. A Field is simply 
some value with an associated name. A Packet is represented as a triplet of header, 
payload data unit (PDU), and trailer. It may also have a description string. The 
description is useful for displaying human-readable packet information on the screen. 
The  header and trailer are defined as linked lists of Fields. Perhaps more 
intriguingly, the PDU is itself defined as a Packet. The Packet class is therefore a nested 
class. This allows packets to be encapsulated inside another packet easily. 
If the PDU is null, then this Packet is the uppermost packet, and all the 
information about the packet is stored in the header. In OSI parlance, an upper layer 
payload is encapsulated inside a lower layer protocol. So uppermost, in this case, means 
the higher layer payload. The current processing system should only concern itself with 
the uppermost packet and payload.  
In this case, there are two possibilities. On one hand, the header list may consist 
of just a single field containing the data payload waiting to be processed. On the other 
hand, the header can be null, indicating that there is no more data to be process, i.e. this 
packet has been fully resolved. 
Hence, packet protocol processing works as follows:  
1) Use the getUppermostPacket method to get the uppermost packet. 
2) Use the getUppermostPayload method to get the uppermost payload to be 
processed. 
3) Process the payload accordingly to derive new header, trailer and PDU 
information. 
4) Replace the uppermost packet's header, PDU and trailer attributes with the new 
information. The new PDU will now become the new uppermost packet to the 




2. Input Subsystem 
The heart of the input subsystem is the ByteServer class. A ByteServer object is 
instantiated by PacketServer, when it is in turn instantiated by the Sniffer class. 
ByteServer is a separate thread of execution from the main Sniffer class. This allows 
input from the sniffer mote to be received in the most responsive way, independent from 
the execution of the rest of the program. 
The ByteServer receives data from the sniffer mote through objects subclassed 
from the Source class. Currently, only the SFSource (or Serial Forwarder Source) class is 
implemented. However, it is perfectly possible to implement other sources if necessary, 
for example a SerialSource class that communicates with the mote directly via serial port 
communications, or a file source to read data previously archived in a file. It shall be seen 
later that additional sources can be easily created and added to the system. By default, 
Serial Forwarder is assumed to be running on the local host, port 9001. If this is not the 
case, then the user can specify a host and port using the “-h” and “-p” options. 
Data read from the source is stored in a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) buffer. In the 
current implementation, when the buffer is full, further packet data are dropped, instead 
of overriding the earliest received data. 
The Sniffer class does not talk to the ByteServer directly, instead it instantiates 
and requests packets from the PacketServer class. PacketServer provides a packet-level 
input abstraction to Sniffer. PacketServer makes requests for received data from 
ByteServer, and then packages the data bytes into a Packet object as its payload. At the 
same time, PacketServer adds a timestamp to this Packet’s header. This timestamp 
information allows for temporal analysis of the packets. Strictly speaking, the timestamp 
does not represent the time the packet is received by the sniffer mote, but the time 
PacketServer receives the data from ByteServer. 
3. Processing Subsystem 
Packet objects received from the input subsystem are passed to the processing 
subsystem, to extract protocol and application layer information. Packet objects are 
passed to the Protocol class and then the AM class in sequence. 
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The first thing that the Protocol class does is to see if it needs to determine the 
message format. TinyOS messages can have 4 different formats, depending on the mote 
used [41]:  
1) The original TOS_Msg format used on mica,mica2, and mica2dot, 
2) the IEEE802.15.4 format used on telos family motes, 
3) the modified TOS_Msg format used on micaz motes, and  
4) the Infineon’s eyesIFX platform [42]. 
The Packet class has a static attribute, msgFormat, that is used to identify the 
format. The Protocol class first checks if this attribute is set. If it has not been set, the 
Protocol class applies some heuristics to try to guess the message format, and set it to the 
appropriate value. If the heuristics fail, then the message format is unknown, and no 
further processing will be done on the packet. It is assumed that a given sensor networks 
is homogenous, so the message format should be consistent. So the guessing of the 
message format is only done once. However, the heuristic rules are not foolproof by any 
means, so the fallback is for the user to specify the message format on the command line 
via the “-m” option. Once the message format is known, the Protocol class performs the 
appropriate protocol processing on the packet. 
Once protocol processing is completed, the packet object is passed to the AM 
class for application processing. Recall that the AM type of a TinyOS message is 
analogous to the port number in TCP/IP. So it is conceivable that in a given sensor 
network, there can be more than one AM type. The AM class maintains a list of AM 
handlers. The AM class iterates through the list, passing the packet object to each AM 
handler. Once an AM handler signals that it has handled the AM type, application 
processing is complete. 
Currently, the only AM handler implemented is the AMCountMsgHandler class, 
for the test application CountRadio. But it is easy to create and add AM handlers. 
4. Output Subsystem 
The Writer class is responsible for writing the packet information to a variety of 
output channels. One of the features of the output subsystem is that packet information 
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can be written to more than one channel simultaneously. Thus the user has the maximum 
flexibility in storing packet information. 
The Writer class maintains a list of Output objects. The ScreenOutput object is 
always available. At the same time, the user can choose to enable other output channels 
using command line options. Currently, the following FileOutput objects are available: 
logging the screen output to file (“-l”), writing to a binary file (“-ob”), and writing to a 
comma separated value (CSV) file (“-oc”). The CSV file, for example, is readily 
imported into Microsoft Excel for data analysis purposes. The binary file, on the other 
hand, provides a more efficient format to store packet information. 
When an Output object is instantiated, its run method is also immediately 
registered with the JVM runtime as a shutdown hook. This is a little known feature of 
Java that was recently added to allow programs to perform last minute clean-ups before 
JVM termination. In this case, the shutdown hooks enable the ScreenOutput object to 
print out packet accounting information, and the FileOutput objects to flush their I/O 
buffers and close the file properly. 
Again, if a particular output channel is not available, it can be easily created and 
added to the system. 
 
D. EXTENDING SNIFFER 
The Sniffer program has been designed so that it is easy to create and add 
functionalities to the various subsystem, without affecting how the rest of the system 
works. Part of the reason for this capability lies in the object oriented nature of Java. In 
general, adding functionality to Sniffer can be done in two steps: subclassing an existing 
class, then making the new class known to the Sniffer at the appropriate code locations. 
1. Adding Input Sources 
New input sources should subclass the Source class, or any of its subclasses, and 
override the open, close, and read methods where necessary.  
Within the main Sniffer class, a new command line option may be specified so 
that the user can choose this input source instead of the default SFSource. Then inside the 
code that checks for this option in parseArgs, the new Source object must be instantiated, 
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and assigned it to the source static variable. ByteServer will automatically interface with 
the new input source. 
2. Adding AM Handlers 
Handlers for new AM types should subclass the AMHandler class, and override 
the processAM method. 
The new AM handler class must then register with the AM class within the 
following code static segment of AM.java: 
 
/*   
 * Static code block. 




   
appsList.add(new AMCountMsgHandler ());	
 




3. Adding output channels 
New output channels should subclass the Output class, and override the open, 
close, write, and run methods where necessary. 
Similar to the input subsystem, within the main Sniffer class, a new command line 
option may be specified so that the user can choose to enable this new output channel. 
Then inside the code that checks for this option in parseArgs, the new Output object must 
be instantiated, and added to Writer’s list of Output objects using the addOutput method. 
Packet information will then be automatically written to the output channel. 
 
E. TEST AND EVALUATION 
The sniffing functionality of the TinyOS sniffer was tested and evaluated using a 
simple test application. For the purpose of this study, the target sensor network is a pair 
of MicaZ motes running the CountRadio application. The sniffer consists of a TelosB 
mote connected to a PC. 
For convenience, it was assumed that the operating radio channel was known. It is 
not difficult to find out anyway – a simple sequential scan through the radio frequency 
channels, or a spectrum analyzer, will easily reveal the operating radio channel. 
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1. CountRadio application 
CountRadio is an example application that can be found under the tinyos/apps/ 
directory. From its README.CountRadio file: 
“CountRadio is a simple led/radio count program.  The default application 
built from this directory is CountDual. CountDual either sends a count 
over the radio if the node address is equal to 1, or displays a count 
received over the radio otherwise.” 
The transmitting mote broadcasts a packet every 200 milliseconds, or five packets 
per second. The payload of the packet has the format defined in the CountMsg.h file: 
enum 
{ 





  uint16_t n; 
  uint16_t src; 
} CountMsg_t;  
 
Hence the payload is of constant four byte length, where the first two bytes 
represent a monotonically increasing sequence number, followed by a constant source 
address which should be 1. Therefore, this provides a very predictable data source to 
verify the correctness of our Sniffer program. 
2. Output 
With the motes up and running, Sniffer is started from the command line with no 
additional options. Figure 10 shows the captured screen output of Sniffer. Each line 
represents one packet. The format of the output is designed to mimic tcpdump to a certain 
extent. It has the following form: 
 
<Timestamp> <Protocol> <Grp>.<Dest>.<AM> (<Len>) [<Payload>] <CRC> 
 
The timestamp is in the 24-hour notation, with up to millisecond precision. The 
protocol is denoted as “TOS”, meaning TinyOS with TinySec disabled. The group ID, 
destination address and AM types are grouped into a “dotted” decimal notation that 
resembles an IP address with its port number.  
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Then using the CSV file output of Sniffer, and importing into Excel, it can be 
further verified that the sequence number N runs in consecutive order, so no packets were 
missed.  
 
Figure 10 Captured screen output of Sniffer sniffing on 2 motes running the 
CountRadio application. The sniffer was started after the motes. Hence the lower 
packet count. 
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3. Observations and Recommendations 
While it would appear that the Sniffer is functioning correctly, the following 
observations are made. 
Timestamp: The first observation is that the intervals between sequential 
packets are not exactly 200 milliseconds, give or take some acceptable deviations. In fact, 
just from the snapshot shown in Figure 10 alone, the interval can be as short as four 
milliseconds, to as large as 400 milliseconds. In a network where the data rate is on the 
order of tens to hundreds of kilobits per second, an error of 400 milliseconds may be 
enough to skew certain traffic analysis. 
The inaccuracy of the timestamp is mainly due to the fact that the sniffer mote 
does not currently have the ability to affix timestamps to sniffed packets as it receives 
them. Instead, the timestamp is only added at the PacketServer level. The fact that the 
Source object is a network interface, while convenient from programming point of view, 
inevitably adds further errors to the timestamp. There is clearly room for improvement.  
CRC: The second, and more important, observation is that CRC information is 
missing. Unfortunately, the point along the TinyOS chain where the CRC information is 
lost could not be determined. But it does point out that the current implementation is 
incomplete, since it cannot provide the packet in its entirety for analysis. 
To address these deficiencies, the Sniffer program should be more tightly 
integrated with the mote hardware. One possibility is to implement a Source object that 
interfaces with the mote directly via the serial link without any mediation. In this way, 
the Source object can also be responsible to affix a timestamp on the received packets for 
a higher degree of accuracy in the timestamp. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
The design and implementation of the Sniffer program has been described in 
detail, including its usage, process flow, and the functions of the major Java classes. It 
has also been explained how new input sources, application handlers, and output channels 
can be easily created and added to the program in a very modular way.  
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The testing of the Sniffer program indicates that there are deficiencies in its 
implementation: firstly, the timestamp has too much deviation. Secondly, the Sniffer does 
not have access to the sniffed packet in its entirety. A tighter integration of the Sniffer 



























TinyOS and IEEE 802.15.4 are the two dominant implementations of sensor 
networks today. TinyOS targets devices where energy and computational power are the 
significant resource constraints. 802.15.4 takes a more modular approach to its design, 
and is suited for a variety of devices and applications. Currently TinyOS is more popular 
in the sensor network community, but that is probably because it has been around longer. 
With 802.15.4 being formally adopted as a standard recently, it should not be long before 
802.15.4 starts to take root in the sensor network community. 
This thesis examined the security architectures of TinyOS and 802.15.4. It found 
that 802.15.4 generally offers higher assurances in terms of cryptographic strength, 
message integrity, and information leakage from IV reuse. TinyOS applications will need 
robust re-keying support and countermeasures against forgery attempts to make up the 
difference.  But they both lack effective peer-level access control and replay protection – 
both important aspects of sensor network security.  
For resource-limited sensor networks, TinyOS is still the better choice. For 
military applications where security and performance needs dominate, it is envisioned 
that a hybrid TinyOS/802.15.4 system would be ideal. Given the open source nature of 
the TinyOS project, it is conceivable that TinyOS can be adapted to leverage on 
802.15.4-compliant hardware for its link layer security, instead of relying on TinySec. 
TinyOS packets can be encapsulated inside 802.15.4 frames, just like TCP/IP packets are 
encapsulated inside 802.11 frames. In this way, sensor network applications can be built 
that enjoy the best of both worlds – the mature and optimized environment of TinyOS, 
and the superior link layer security offered by 802.15.4. 
As a tool for validating the above security analysis and also to perform further 
analysis, the design and implementation of a TinyOS sniffer application was presented. A 
sniffer is the quintessential tool for modern day network analysis. But such a tool is 
presently lacking in today’s sensor network development kits. The current design is based 
on existing sensor network hardware and software components to enable a low-cost 
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sniffer implementation. The sniffer has also been designed to be easily extensible in 
terms of functionalities. 
The following topics are the recommended for further research: 
• Improve the functionality of the TinyOS sniffer. Areas of improvement 
include tighter integration of the Sniffer with the mote hardware, and 
additional output modes for packet data such as the extensible markup 
language (XML) format. 
• Integrate TinyOS with 802.15.4-compliant hardware for high assurance 
applications, with support for peer-level access control and replay protection. 
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